Showing posts with label Ireland and IMF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ireland and IMF. Show all posts

Monday, June 22, 2015

22/6/15: IMF Review of Ireland: Part 1: Growth & Fiscal Space


IMF published conclusions of its Third Post-Program Monitoring Discussions with Ireland.

The report starts with strong positives:

"Ireland’s strong economic recovery is continuing in 2015, following robust growth of 4.8 percent in 2014. A range of high frequency indicators point to an extension of the solid recovery momentum into 2015, with growth increasingly driven by domestic demand as well as exports. Job creation continued with employment growth of 2.2 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2015, bringing the unemployment rate down to 9.8 percent in May."

Actually, based on EH data from CSO, employment growth was even stronger: 2.67% y/y in 1Q 2015 (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/06/20615-irish-employment-by-sector-latest.html). The survey data is slightly different from the QNHS data.

"Tax revenues rose 11 percent year-on-year during the first five months of 2015, while spending remained within budget profiles, so the fiscal deficit for 2015 is expected to be 2.3 percent of GDP, outperforming the budget targets."

"Banks’ health has improved, but operating profitability remains weak and, despite the recent progress in the resolution of mortgages in arrears, 17.1 percent of mortgages have been in arrears for over 90 days, and of these, almost 60 percent have been in arrears for over 2 years."

All so far known, all so far predictable.

Here is what IMF thinks in terms of forward outlook.

On Fiscal side: "The deficit is likely to come in well below budget again in 2015. This welcome progress should be locked by avoiding any repeat of past spending overruns. The deficit reduction projected for 2016 is too modest considering Ireland’s high public debt and strong growth, making it critical that revenue outperformance— which appears likely— be saved as the authorities intend."

Wait, Spring Statement by the Government clearly does not suggest 'saving' of revenue outperformance as intended policy objective. If anything, spending these 'savings' is on the cards. So a bit more from the IMF:

"Medium-term spending pressures related to demographics and public investment indicate a need to build revenues and it is critical that any unwinding of savings in public sector wages be gradual. Tax reforms should be focused on areas most supportive of job creation and productivity while protecting progress achieved in base broadening."

Again, this does not bode well with the Spring Statement intentions to unwind, over two years, reductions in public sector earnings costs, and reducing tax burden at the lower end of the tax base. Whether these measures are right or wrong, IMF seems to ignore them in their analysis, as if they are not being planned.

And slightly adding depth: "Staff estimates that improvement in the primary balance in structural terms is modest in 2016, at about ¼ percent of GDP, as the reduction in the overall deficit partly reflects an expected decline in the interest bill and a narrowing of the output gap." In other words, efforts / pain are over. We are cruising into improved performance on inertia. IMF does not exactly like that: "A stronger adjustment, of at least a ½ percent of GDP, would also be appropriate in 2016 in view of Ireland’s high public debt and strong growth, implying an overall deficit target of about 1.5 percent of GDP. However, it appears most likely that revenues will exceed official projections, which are for tax revenue growth before measures that is significantly below nominal GDP growth, and also given that revenue outperformance has underpinned Ireland’s track record of over delivering on fiscal targets for a number of years." Wait, what? Not spending cuts drove Irish effort? Revenue outperformance? Aka - taxes and indirect taxes and hidden charges.

So the good boy in the back of the classroom needs to get slightly better: "The commitment of the Irish authorities to comply with their obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact, including the Expenditure Benchmark, means that revenue outperformance in 2016 and later years will not be used to fund additional expenditure; the need for a change from the past procyclical pattern of spending the revenues available was a key lesson drawn from the crisis that is firmly embedded in their new fiscal policy framework."

Yeah, that in the year pre-election? Are they mad, or something?

Just in case anyone has any illusions on what the Fund thinks about the forthcoming injections of pain relief planned by the Government, here it is, slightly hidden in the lengthy discourse about longer-term risks. "Looking to the medium term, sizable adjustment challenges indicate a need to build revenues while the limited fiscal space should be used to support durable growth. The authorities’ expenditure projections account for demographic pressures as growing cohorts of both young and old increase demands for education and health services. …Staff recommended that the authorities consider steps to raise revenues to help address these pressures…"

More revenue to be raised. And yet the Government aims to cut taxes. Oh dear...


Back to the positives: IMF upgraded its growth projections for short-term forecasts:

"Compared with the 2015 Article IV consultation concluded in late March, growth projected for 2015 is revised up to almost 4 percent from 3½ percent, with a more modest increase in 2016." 2016 growth is now projected to be at 3.3% from 3.0% projected at the end of March 2015. 2017 growth forecast was lifted from 2.7% in March to 2.8% now. However, 2018 forest was balanced down to 2.5% now from 2.6% in March report.

Back in March, private consumption was expected to grow 1.5% in 2015, 1.6% in 2016, 2.0% in 2017. This is now revised up to 1.6% in 2015, 1.9% in 2016, with 2017 remaining at 2.0%.

However, IMF revised down its projections for gross fixed investment growth. In March report, the Fund forecast investment to grow 9.5% in 2015, 7.5% in 2016 and 6.0% in 2017. This time around, IMF expects investment growth of 9.2% in 2015, 7.3% in 2016 and 5.5% in 2017.

Interestingly, IMF also introduced some modest upgrades to Irish net exports, though it noted that given exceptionally high rates of growth in goods exports in recent months, even the upgraded forecast might be too pessimistic.

However, with all said and done, the IMF still produces a slightly cautious medium-term outlook: "Staff’s medium-term outlook is little changed from that in the 2015 Article IV consultation, with medium-term growth on the order of 2½ percent being similar to the 3 percent projected by the Irish authorities in their recent Stability Programme Update (SPU)." Which means that, in basic terms, Irish official forecasts are probably within error margin of the IMF forecasts, but are a bit more optimistic, nonetheless.

Quite interestingly, IMF finds no substantive risks to the downside for Ireland, going effectively through motions referencing Greece and domestic debt overhang. Even interest rates sensitivity of the massive debt pile we carry deserves not to be cited as a major concern.

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

9/9/2014: An IMF Loans Deal Can Be a Win-Win for EU and Ireland

Earlier today I was covering the topic of Ireland seeking an early repayment of the IMF loans on the CNBC (@CNBCWEXhttp://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000309131. Here is a quick note summarising my views on the topic.


DEAL: The Irish Government is hoping to refinance the IMF portion of the Troika debt to achieve annual savings of some EUR375 million due to lower bond yields enjoyed by Ireland today compared to the IMF interest charges. The Government is looking to pay down EUR15 billion of the EUR22.5 billion total the country owes to the IMF.

IMF loans come with 4.99% interest rate against 1.80% marketable yield on Irish Government 10 year bonds. Back in July, Irish Finance Minister, Michael Noonan said he aims to refinance the first EUR5 billion of IMF loans before end of December, with the same tranche going for refinancing in the first half of 2015 and a final EUR5 billion in 2016.

Since then, following the ECB’s latest rate cut last week, Irish Government yields hit negative territory and yields on 10 year paper are currently trading at yields of under 1.7%.

The Government also has EUR20.6 billion in cash reserves that can be used to fund IMF loans buy-out. And the fiscal performance in 8 months through August 2014 has been surprisingly strong, even stripping out one-off payments.


INCENTIVES: The Irish Government interest in refinancing IMF loans is driven by both political and economic considerations.

On political front, the Coalition Government suffered heavy defeats in the European and Local elections earlier this year. So the Government needs to deliver new savings in Exchequer spending to allow for a reduction in austerity pressures in Budget 2015. Savings of few hundred millions of euros will help. And an ability to claim that the IMF loans have been repaid, even if only by borrowing elsewhere to fund these repayments, can go well with the media and the voters tired of the Troika. Optics and reality are coincident in the case of refinancing IMF borrowings, creating a powerful incentive to deliver.

Additional consideration is provided by the Government failure to secure a deal on legacy banks’ debts (see below), which de facto aligns Irish Government political interests with those of the EU.

On economic incentives side, the Government clearly is forwarding borrowing and re-profiling its bonds/debt maturity timings to minimise short-term pain of forthcoming repayments and to safeguard against the potential future increases in the rates and yields. Especially since the latest Exchequer figures are pointing to Ireland significantly outperforming the Troika targets for 2014-2015 and the economy is showing signs of recovery.

All-in, this is a smart move for the Irish Government and a win-win for the economy, the EU and the governing Coalition.


SUPPORT:  In August, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Jyrki Katainen said that in his view, Irish plan to pay down IMF portion of the Troika loans ahead of schedule makes sense.

The EU Commissioner statement came on foot of the letter by the IMF mission head to Ireland, Craig Beaumont in which he said that the Fund will not impose early repayment penalty on Ireland, were the Government to refinance its debt.

Last week, Mario Draghi cautiously commented on the deal. When asked about his position on it, Draghi said that the ECB “took note” of the proposal and will monitor “very, very closely what is being done with the sale of assets so that monetary financing concerns are being properly and significantly addressed.” In other words, Draghi explicitly linked the IMF refinancing deal with the IBRC-legacy bonds held by the Central Bank of Ireland. The ECB has always signalled that it is interested in seeing Irish Government disposing of these bonds at an accelerated schedule. The accelerated disposal of the bonds means that the Irish Government sells these bonds in the markets to private holders and the coupon payments on these bonds become payable not to the Central Bank (which can recycle payments back to the Exchequer) but to private bondholders. On the other hand, however, the value of these bonds is now likely to be over par, implying that disposing of them today can generate capital gains for the Exchequer. At any rate, Mr Draghi’s statements does signal the ECB willingness to deal on the prospect for refinancing of the IMF loans.

Regardless of Mr Draghi’s comments, we had more statements in support of the deal so far in the last few days with unnamed EU Commission sources indicating further EU support.

As the decision remains with the Euro area governments on whether such a repayment will trigger automatic repayment of other multilateral loans, these are more important than Mr. Draghi’s position. As long as the ECB does not actively object to the deal, Minister Noonan is likely to secure an agreement without triggering automatic repayment of the remaining loans.

The reason for this is simple. In June 2012, the EU promised to review sustainability of Irish public debt in light of potential retroactive recapitalisation of the Irish banks. However, with subsequent developments, it became painfully clear that the Euro states had no intention of providing any significant support for Ireland. In order to back out of the proverbial corner, the EU will look favourably on any debt restructuring or refinancing deal the Irish authorities can design that does not imply retrospective recapitalisations.

Letting Ireland have a EUR375 million annual breathing space is a cheap solution to the EU's dilemma of issuing promises, without any intention of following through on them. 


REALITY: The truth, however, remains simple. EU and ECB insistence in 2008-2011 on paying in full on Irish banks debts has derailed Irish economy and is costing this country in terms of lower economic growth, high unemployment, high burden of taxation and dysfunctional banking system saddled with legacy debts. EUR375 million savings - welcome as they might be - is a proverbial plaster applied to a gaping wound left on Irish public finances by the crisis.


IMPACT: In the short run, refinancing IMF loans will provide improvement in the sovereign cash flow, but can cause the rebalancing of some private portfolios of Irish government debt.

In the longer run, the direct effect of a successful refinancing of the IMF loans can lead to a small, but a positive change in the Government debt dynamics. The definitive point here is what the Irish Government is likely to do with any savings achieved through the debt restructuring.

If the funds were to be used to fund earlier closing off of other official loans or closing off the remaining (and still large) deficit gap, there is likely to be a positive impact in terms of markets expectations and this will support better risk assessment of the sovereign debt dynamics. However, this is unlikely, due to the strong political momentum in favour of spending the new savings on reversing, in part, public sector spending cuts and state wages moderation. The problem is that in this case, interest costs reductions achieved under the deal will simply be consumed by remaining inefficiencies within the public sector. Such a move would likely be detrimental to Ireland's debt sustainability in the longer run.


It is worth noting that in 8 months through August, the Government took in EUR971 million more in tax revenues (UER700 million if one-off measures are netted out) than it planned in the Budget 2014, so some tax rebate is overdue, given the hefty burden of taxes-linked austerity on Irish economy. But the state is still borrowing EUR800 million per month to fund its spending. And we spent around EUR5.5 billion so far this year on funding interest payments on the debt.

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

18/6/2014: ECB Assessment of Irish Banks: IMF view


In the previous post, I looked at the IMF report on Irish banks from the point of view of ongoing developments and balance sheet repairs (link here). Now, let's take a look at IMF report from the point of view of the ECB stress tests.

Per IMF: "The ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment and corrective actions where needed are important to reinforce confidence in European banks, including in Ireland (see stress tests parameters described below).

"AIB, BoI, and PTSB all reported capital ratios above the regulatory minima at end 2013. Notwithstanding, a finding of a capital need under the Assessment cannot be precluded, with results due to be announced in October." In effect, here's your warning, Ireland - IMF has no confidence as to the outcome of the tests and this is in line with the risks to the sector still working through banks balance sheets, as highlighted in the previous post.

Never mind, though, as per IMF "Private capital is the first line of recourse and it is welcome that market conditions for European bank equity issuance currently appear relatively favorable."

While IMF seems to think there are plenty of crazies out there willing to bet a house on banks stocks valuations, the IMF is still hedging its bets: "Nonetheless, where private capital is insufficient, public support may be needed, including from a common euro area backstop to protect market confidence and financial stability; the possibility of ESM direct recapitalization should not be excluded."

Which begs a question or two:
1) Will ESM come in ahead of irish taxpayers? Answer - unlikely.
2) If ESM were to come in, will it have seniority over previous taxpayers equity in the banks (in other words, will it destroy whatever recoverable value we have achieved so far)? Answer - likely.

IMF is less gung-ho on the idea of immediate state supports in the worst case scenario: "If the supervisory risk element of the assessment identifies other issues, such as profitability or liquidity, staff considers these should be addressed over time in a manner that contains costs while firmly safeguarding financial stability. This is especially important for PTSB, where staff continues to see risks to its return to adequate profitability over a reasonable horizon in its current form, but approval of its European Commission restructuring plan is on hold pending completion of the Assessment."

Oh… ouch…

A chart to illustrate the pains:



Watch that equity cushion in the above for PTSB and the margin on provisions… No wonder IMF is feeling a bit uneasy. But across all banks, Gross Non-performing Loans are nearly par or in excess of the Provisions + Equity + Sub-Debt.

Now onto stress tests.

Agin per IMF: "Irish banks are currently undergoing the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment (CA). The five largest banks are included: three Irish headquartered banks (AIB, BoI, PTSB), and the domestic subsidiaries of Merrill Lynch and Royal Bank of Scotland. Based on end 2013 data, the CA comprises:
(i) an Asset Quality Review (AQR);
(ii) a forward looking stress test covering 2014–16; and
(iii) a supervisory assessment of key risks in banks’ balance sheets, including liquidity, leverage, and funding."

First thing to note: the time horizon for tests is exceptionally narrow: 2014-2016, or 36 months, of which (by the time the tests are done, at least 6 months data will be already provided). Does anyone think Irish banks will have full visibility on risks and downsides expiring at 2016 end? Good luck to ye.

"The AQR will audit banks’ banking and trading books. For each bank, at least half of the credit risk weighted assets and at least half of the material portfolios will be covered. For the banking book, the AQR will look at the impairment and loan classification, valuation of collateral, and fair valuation of assets, while core processes, pricing models, and revaluation of Level 3 derivatives will be covered in the trading book review. Compared with the CBI’s BSA in 2013, the AQR for the CA has narrower coverage of the banking book by risk weighted assets (RWA), it does not review banks’ RWA models, but does cover the trading book although such exposures are not large for the domestic retail banks."

What this means is that the forthcoming tests are less robust than the CBI tests, but that assumes CBI tests were robust enough.

IMF provides a handy set of charts summarising stress scenario, baseline scenario for the CA against IMF own projections.





"The CA will apply a common equity tier 1 risk based capital floor of 8 percent for the AQR and the stress test baseline, and 5.5 percent for the adverse scenario, using the relevant transitional definitions. Results will be announced in October. If a capital need is identified, the additional capital will have to be raised within 6 months if the shortfall occurs under the AQR or baseline scenario, or within 9 months if it arises under the stress scenario."

In my view, CET1 at 8% floor is a bit aggressive. The floor should have been around 9-10% for Irish banks (and all other distressed banks), while for stronger banks the floor could be 7-8%. But ECB does not want to differentiate ex ante the banking quality tiers present in the euro area markets. Which is fine, but yields and outcome that strongest banks have implied identical floor as the weakest ones.

So overall, my view is that the IMF is being rightly cautious about the banks prospects under the ECB CA exercise. The Fund is hedging clearly in referencing the possibility for banks failing the tests. Key point is that the IMF - having had access to CBI and Department of Finance data and assessments, cannot rule out the possibility that Irish banks might need additional capital and that this capital may require taxpayers stepping in.

Next up: Households Balance Sheets

18/6/2014: IMF on Irish Banks: Still Sick to the Core, but of course, getting better...


IMF released Staff Report on the First Post-Program Monitoring Discussion for Ireland. Some of the highlights over few posts.

First up: banks.

Per IMF: "Banks’ 2013 financial statements show higher provisions and, although easing funding costs are supporting bank profitability, credit continues to contract." Ugh? Surely not because the banks are lowering rates on existent and new debt? CBI data shows no such moves.

Here is how dramatic was the decline in banks funding costs (all declines down to ECB lower rates, plus Government ratings improving):


"AIB, BoI, and Permanent tsb (PTSB) set aside provisions totaling €2.5 billion in the second half,
reflecting the CBI’s updated guidelines introduced in May 2013 and the CBI’s balance sheet assessment (BSA) finalized at end November, together with allowances for new NPLs."

Coverage ratios of provisions to NPLs increased at all the banks. Which is good for banks balance sheets and forward potential for lending, but bad for current potential. And it is material for the stress tests forthcoming (see next post on this).

"Higher net interest income in  2013 partly offset provisioning to result in a smaller full year overall loss than in 2012. However, new lending remained weak, with credit outstanding to households and non-financial firms contracting 3.7 percent and 6.2 percent y/y, respectively, in April."

Ah, I wrote loads about credit supply problems: here's a note on latest data for credit supply to households http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/1062014-credit-to-irish-households-q1.html and another one on latest data on credit supply to Irish private sector enterprises: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/662014-credit-to-irish-resident.html And the third post coming up today will cover the margins banks charge on loans relative to what they pay on deposits... the margins that act to extract value out of the economy.

And here's IMF's chart summarising the above developments:



All said, banking sector remains one of the core weak points. In assessing downside risks to Fund's forecasts for Ireland, IMF identified 4 key sources of risks. Banks are the fourth: "Bank repair shortfalls. As firms’ internal financing capacity is drawn down, sustaining domestic demand recovery will depend increasingly on a revival of sound lending, where substantial work remains ahead to resolve high NPLs to underpin banks’ lending capacity."

But for all the talk, banks remain sick. Per IMF: "Banks’ NPLs remain very high, at 27 percent of loans at end 2013, in a range of 17–35 percent across the three Irish headquartered banks. Such ratios reduce banks’ potential capacity to lend by hurting profitability, including through higher market funding costs, limiting the supply of collateral for funding, and diverting credit skills. With recovery taking root and property markets improving, banks may see further upside from postponing NPL resolution. But such choices at the individual bank level may not sufficiently internalize the macroeconomic impact of banks collectively leaving NPLs at high levels in terms of barriers to new lending and an inefficient allocation of capital, warranting supervisory pressure on banks to accelerate asset clean up. Reducing uncertainties around the value of banks’ loans will also enhance public debt sustainability by supporting valuations for the government’s bank equity holdings, which it intends to dispose."

Here's an interesting bit. We know banks have been slow to deal with Buy-to-Lets, parking bad loans in hope that current debtor will part-fund warehousing of BTL properties (via renting them out) until such time when prices rise and bank can foreclose on these. This strategy clearly maximises banks returns and is happy-times for CBofI, concerned with how good banks look on their 'profitability' side. But it is bad news for the economy, where investors (aka ordinary punters) are bled dry of cash to fund BTLs which will never return any fund they 'invested' in them.

IMF basically tells the CBofI and Irish authorities: you have to force banks deal with these BTLs and smaller CRE loans, i.e. foreclose earlier, not later.

And IMF is onto the task: "In view of improved market conditions, the authorities should press banks to broaden their resolution efforts into impaired CRE loans. Banks hold mostly smaller CRE exposures (below €20 million) that were not transferred to NAMA, yet delinquent CRE loans still account for 40 percent of NPLs. Recent strong IBRC and NAMA deal flow points to potential investor interest—although the nature of the assets differ somewhat—and the banks’ portfolios also have relatively high provisioning cover. Staff therefore recommends that banking supervision press forward the restructuring of these NPLs or their disposal in a manner that achieves sufficient deal flow while avoiding flooding markets. Although one bank is exploring disposal options for its CRE loan portfolio, others prefer loan restructuring to retain potential upside and their customer base."

And a handy chart:


Do notice how weaker provisions cover is delivered on mortgages, while over-provision is a feature of other loans? Priorities… priorities…

SMEs loans are still a huge problem: "SME loan workouts will require ongoing oversight to ensure viability is restored. The two main banks making loans to SMEs report substantial progress in developing workouts for their distressed SME loans, although in practice such workouts will be implemented over some years as restructuring steps by SMEs move forward." Read: the reports are fine, but we won't see full results over some time. Question, unposited by the IMF is: why?

"Recent amendments to the Companies Act facilitating SME less costly examinership procedures are expected to become operational in June, which may be most useful in multi-creditor cases as banks otherwise prefer to conclude workouts outside of the courts."

And finally: mortgages arrears:

"Mortgage resolution should be both timely and durable. …Banks report that by end March they had concluded solutions for over 25 percent of primary dwelling and buy to let loans in arrears for more than 90 days." Never mind the rest?.. Oh, by the way - of 132,217 accounts in arrears in Q1 2014, 39,111 accounts are less than 90 days in arrears. Of all mortgages that were restructured (92,442 accounts) only 53,580 accounts are not in arrears following restructuring. Again, IMF ignores this.

"Targeted audits give the CBI comfort that the solutions underway are durable, but reducing reliance on shortterm modifications paying interest only or less remains important." Interestingly, this is what we - IMHO - have discussed in depth with the IMF team. Irish authorities have seemingly no problem with the banks 'restructuring' mortgages by loading more debt onto households and spreading this debt either over greater duration or offering temporary relief from cash flow pressures of this debt.

How sustainable is this? Well, 'targeted audits' might suggest that a household that owed 100K on a property and was unable to fund it at full rate, can be made sustainable with 110K debt over same property but with 3 years worth of interest-only repayments. I am not so sure. Neither, it appears, is the IMF.

Another thing we discussed with the IMF: "Securing constructive engagement by borrowers remains a key challenge to progress, where extending independent advice to borrowers willing to negotiate with lenders may be helpful."

So far, the CBI has given independent advisers no support whatsoever and given the banks no encouragement to engage with such advisers. IMHO has worked closely with some banks to deliver such advice - and we have a proven track record showing it works. But two 'pillar' banks refuse to engage with us and any other independent advisor on any terms, unless the borrowers pay directly for advice out of their own pockets. Even IMF now sees this to be completely nonsensical.

Last bit: "The Insolvency Service is developing a protocol to standardize loan modifications, which could also help." So IMF now endorses idea of standardised solutions. From 2010 on, when mortgages crisis blew up, I campaigned for the state to impose onto banks standardised resolution products, such as loans modifications parameters, arrears capitalisation and write downs parameters etc. The state refused. We at IMHO briefed the Central Bank on the need for such standardisation. Our submissions were ignored.


Next: ECB Assessment of Irish Banks: IMF view

Friday, October 4, 2013

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Growth Warnings

So IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding.

Key points:

"Real GDP declined in the first quarter, reflecting a fall in exports and weak domestic demand. Nonetheless, fiscal results remain on track and sovereign and bank bond yields have risen relatively modestly in response to declining global risk  appetite. A range of other economic indicators are more encouraging, suggesting lower but still positive growth in 2013, though uncertainty remains. Growth projections for 2014 are also lowered given weaker prospects for consumption recovery and for trading partner growth."

So weaker than forecast growth conditions… ok… How much weaker?

"Balancing the weak GDP results for the first quarter against a range of more positive indicators, the growth projection for 2013 has been pared back by a ½ percentage point to 0.6 percent y/y, but uncertainties remain." Boom! Ugly stuff, folks. And replace 'but' with 'and' and you will get a double Boom!


"Most importantly, export growth has been cut by 1½ percentage points as data indicate a larger impact from the patent cliff and tepid recoveries in important trading partners. Lower imports dampen the impact on growth." Wait, weren't we told that patent cliff doesn't matter much cause exports are offset by imports etc?

"Domestic demand is expected to be flat, with private consumption still contracting modestly owing to fiscal consolidation and household debt reduction, cushioned by employment growth and low inflation. Fixed investment is expected to expand by some 2 percent given improving business sentiment and the uptick in housing starts, but remains the most volatile GDP component. This projection will need to be further reviewed when Q2 national accounts data become available near end September." We have that Q2 data available now… see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-domestic-economy-continuing-its.html and it ain't pretty…

More details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-h1-2013-qna-domestic-economy-vs.html Net: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (basically investment in the economy) is down 9.40% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, down 14.09% compared to H1 2011 and down 67.73% compared to H1 2007. The reductions in capital investment jun H1 2013 compared to H1 2007 are ten-fold the size of reductions in current Government spending at EUR17,542 million. For another comparison, reductions in personal expenditure on goods and services by households over the same period is EUR4,757 million.

"Weaker consumption and export growth are expected to dampen the pace of recovery, with growth now penciled in at 1.8 percent in 2014. Export and consumption growth are expected to benefit from a projected rise in trading partner growth with employment growth contributing to incomes and confidence. Although consumption growth is still expected to become modestly positive in 2014, the pick up is weaker because a 1½ percentage point downward revision to household saving in 2012 suggests less room for lower savings given the priority households attach to debt reduction. Public consumption is also expected to be softer than previously anticipated as the full effects of the Haddington Road Agreement feed through in 2014. Export growth in 2014 is scaled back to reflect the possibility that recent weakness could persist."

Per IMF: "Growth firms to 2½ percent in 2015 as external growth rises further and fiscal consolidation eases, but durable recovery hinges on reversing the tide of NPLs." The miracle of 3%+ growth for ever, projected back in 2010-2011 to start in 2013-2014 is now replaced by the miracle of 2.5% growth projected to start in 2015… And the new projections out to 2018 no longer feature a single year of growth expected to rise above 2.5%… but all is still sustainable, just as it was in 2010 and 2011 and 2012 and… And the dream of 2.5% growth will, per IMF, be consistent with a positive output gap of ca 0.3%, which means that that is not the expected long-run real growth rate.

In effect, IMF admits now that Ireland cannot be expected to grow sustainably at the rates in excess of 3% per annum in real terms. Say goodbye to Ireland's 'growth miracle', say hello to Ireland's Belgium decades...


Another kicker: after 2015: "…the recovery continues to rely principally on net exports as domestic demand recovery is expected to be protracted as many households continue to deleverage in the medium term. Resolution of mortgages is not expected provide significant direct support to consumption recovery, as while some households may have a reduction in debt service due under a split mortgage restructuring, they may have previously been temporarily on interest-only terms, while other households may need to adjust consumption to serving their debt even if the debt service due is reduced. Rather it is expected that progress in reducing NPLs and enhancing bank profitability will gradually enhance the terms of banks’ access to market funding and their ability and willingness to lend to less indebted borrowers—which includes the younger cohort of households—unlocking housing market turnover and reducing household uncertainty."

Wow! So the IMF is warning us that things are going to remain tough even after the mortgages crisis 'resolutions'… Not like our Government is listening… And the IMF is telling us that the economy is going to get more polarised and paralysed... where did you hear that? Oh... http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/782013-sunday-times-july-28-2013.html

Employment: long-term unemployment remains a problem (we know that)… and surprisingly: "Facilitating SME examinership could aid resolution of SMEs in arrears, supporting their potential to invest and create jobs." Now, here's the key point: in all this excitement about family homes and repossessions we forgot that roughly 50% of SMEs loans are in arrears… and of the remaining 50%, unknown quantum is at risk… Hm… I wonder how that 'facilitated examinership' going to work for the employment stats and for property markets and mortgages arrears, when examiners go into the SMEs books to uncover potential subsidies to proprietor's income or when examinerships lead to cuts in employment levels?..

So back in 2011, IMF predicted Irish economy to grow 2.4% (GDP) in 2013, 2.9% in 2014 and 3.3% in 2015. This time, IMF is projecting Irish economy to grow 0.6% in 2013, 1.8% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Nominal GDP was supposed to reach EUR182.5 billion by end of 2015 back in 2011 projections and is now forecast to reach EUR178.4 billion… What's being down EUR4.1 billion (one year difference) between friends, or EUR6.5 billion over three years, eh? Especially when all of this is sustainable, right?..

Still, gives us some perspective as to the whole circus going on: we are sticking to EUR3.1 billion fiscal target for 'adjustment' and washing off EUR4.1 billion in growth expectations underpinning 'sustainability' analysis… You'd think this is monkeys with abacus, but no - these are highly paid 'analysts', 'economists' on Government side, state side, sell-side at stockbrokerages and banks, ECB side, EU side, IMF side… And they all sing in unison: all is sustainable, just as they revise continuously their forecasts down and down and down. Which begs a question: at what stage will the sustainability malarky be replaced by the admission of the crisis? Presumably when GDP growth is revised to nil into perpetuity?

I will be updating charts on Irish economy forecasts from the IMF over the next few days, so stay tuned. Before that, I will be blogging more on key topics covered by the IMF review later today, also stay tuned…

Saturday, March 23, 2013

23/3/2013: IMF 9th Review of Ireland's Programme



IMF Completed 9th Review with Ireland:

"Ireland’s strong policy implementation has continued and positive signs are emerging. Real GDP growth was 0.9 percent in 2012, and employment rose slightly over the year, although unemployment remains high at 14.2 percent. Further deepening its market access, Ireland issued €5 billion of 10 year bonds at 4.15 percent in March."

"The 2012 fiscal deficit of 7¾ percent of GDP was well within the 8.6 percent target. In 2013, the fiscal deficit is projected at 6¾ percent of GDP, moving toward the target of below 3 percent by 2015.  Public debt is expected to peak at 122½  percent of GDP this year and decline in later years provided growth picks up from the 1 percent rate projected in 2013."

"Financial sector reforms have continued to advance, but banks remain weighed down by nonperforming loans at about 25 percent of total loans." Per Mr. David Lipton, First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair:

"…problem loans remain high and accelerating their resolution is a key to economic recovery. The recent establishment of mortgage loan restructuring targets for banks is therefore welcome, and it will be supported by reforms announced by authorities that facilitate constructive engagement between banks and borrowers, promote the efficiency of repossession procedures as a last resort, provide banks with the right incentives through provisioning rules, and by sound implementation of the personal insolvency reform. Progress with resolution efforts for SME loans is also a priority.

“Building on the strong budget outturn for 2012, sound budget execution remains critical in 2013, including continued vigilance on health spending and a successful introduction of the property tax...

“Prospects for Ireland’s exit from official support have improved, yet continued strong policy implementation remains paramount given risks to medium-term growth and debt sustainability. Timely and forceful delivery on European pledges to improve program sustainability, especially by breaking the vicious circle between the banks and the Irish sovereign, would go a long way toward Ireland’s durable exit from drawing on official support.”

Thursday, December 20, 2012

20/12/2012: Pensions, health costs & education fees for 2014-2015


Staying with the IMF report on Ireland, and with the theme of 2014-2015 adjustments, here's again what the IMF had to say on what we should expect from the Government:

"The authorities should outline the remaining consolidation measures for 2014–15 around the time of Budget 2013 (MEFP ¶8). The program envisages additional consolidation of 3 percent of GDP over 2014–15. Taking into account the measures already specified for these years (such as on capital spending), and carryover savings from earlier measures, new measures of about 1½ to 2 percent of GDP remain to be identified for 2014-15."

I wrote about the above here. But there's more:

"To maximize the credibility of fiscal consolidation, and to reduce household and business uncertainties, the authorities should set out directions for some of the deeper reforms that will deliver this effort. These could include, for instance, on the revenue side, reforming tax reliefs on private pension contributions; and on the expenditure side, greater use of generic drugs and primary and community healthcare, and an affordable loan scheme for tertiary education to enable rising demand to be met at reasonable cost."

Further, per box-out on Health costs overrun: "there is scope for increased cost recovery in respect of private patients‘ use of public hospitals"

Hence, per IMF, the Government should hit even harder privately provided pensions (on top of the wealth tax already imposed), thus undermining even more private pensions pools and increasing dependency on state pensions. For those of us with kids, IMF - concerned with already unsustainably high personal debt levels - has in store more debt. This time to pay for our kids education. And for those of us with health insurance, there is more to pay too.

The above combination of measures is idiocy of the highest order. Per IMF, Irish economy is suffering from private debt overhang which leads to more deleveraging, less consumption and less investment. And these lead to lower growth. I agree. But what IMF is proposing is going to:

  • Increase private debts and reduce the speed of deleveraging, and
  • Raise the demand for already stretched public services.
This is the Willie Sutton moment for Ireland: the state (with the IMF blessing) is simply plundering through any source of money left in the country is a hope of finding a quick fix for Government insolvency. Now, with low hanging fruit already bagged, this process is starting to directly impact our ability to sustain private debts. But no one gives a damn! As Sutton, allegedly claimed, it makes sense to rob banks, because that is where the money are. Alas, with banks out of money, the Government, prompted by the IMF 'advice' is going to continue robbing us.

So a message to our Pensions industry, which hoped that going along with expropriation of customers' funds via pensions levy would allow the industry to avoid changes to tax incentives on pensions (the blood of the sector demand). Prepare for tax reliefs savaging. Once you fail to stand up to the bullies and protect the interests of your customers, you deserve what you are going to get. Every bit of it.

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

19/12/2012: Fiscal Issues, flagged by the IMF


Keep on reading the IMF report, folks. Nice little bots on offer regarding the fiscal programme performance.

Platitudes abound, well-deserved, but...

"A combination of slower growth, higher unemployment, and the over-run in health spending, have dimmed prospects for any significant fiscal over performance in 2012. Indeed, given the weak economic conditions, only about half of the 6 percent of GDP consolidation effort over 2011-12 has translated into headline primary balance improvement. [Meaning that we've been running into a massive headwind, with pants caught on rose bushes behind us...] Nonetheless, the authorities‘ consistent achievement of the original program fiscal targets despite adverse macroeconomic conditions gives confidence in their institutional capacity and commitment to consolidation."

Question is, when will rose bushes thorns get our fiscal pants shredded? We don't know, but here's the road ahead:
Of course, we knew this before, but it is a nice reminder that Enda Kenny's claim that Budget 2013 is going to be the hardest of all budgets is simply bull - the above figures have to be delivered on top of Enda's 'hardest' Budget 2013. Per IMF, however:
"The program envisages additional consolidation of 3 percent of GDP over 2014–15. Taking into account the measures already specified for these years (such as on capital spending), and carryover savings from earlier measures, new measures of about 1½ to 2 percent of GDP remain to be identified for 2014-15.

"To maximize the credibility of fiscal consolidation, and to reduce household and business uncertainties, the authorities should set out directions for some of the deeper reforms that will deliver this effort. These could include, for instance, on the revenue side, reforming tax reliefs on private pension contributions; and on the expenditure side, greater use of generic drugs and primary and community healthcare, and an affordable loan scheme for tertiary education to enable rising demand to be met at reasonable cost."

In other words, the Government will have to find somewhere around €3-3.2bn more cuts/tax hikes in 2014-2015 on top of those already factored in for 2013.

Now, in spirit with IMF paper, let me reproduce for you a box-out from IMF report on public sector wages in Ireland:


Enjoy the above - you can enlarge the text by clicking on the images.

19/12/2012: IMF on Irish Banks Zombies


Continuing with reading IMF latest report on Ireland, here's another bit. This time about Irish banks. Now, recall that in recent months and days we heard about Bank of Ireland and AIB meeting their lending targets, the latest data on mortgages printed a little rise in the number of them outstanding etc. The Government has been running around telling anyone willing to listen (not many, admittedly) that banks are 'repaired' and 'well-capitalized'. Here's IMF take on the comedy (emphasis is mine):

"Bank lending has remained weak. Lending flows have fallen to new lows, with gross mortgage loans to households down 10.3 percent y/y in the first three quarters of 2012 and new SME loan drawdowns (excluding financial intermediation and property-related) down 20.7 percent y/y in first half. Interest rates on SME loans (proxied by loan agreements below €1 million) remain well above euro area average levels."

Few charts:

So as the economy is starving for credit, irish banks - heavily subsidized by ELA and ECB funding (see below) are gouging SMEs for every last bit they can squeeze. Jobs creation in this environment? You gotta be kidding!


While the banks have deleveraged somewhat out of ELA and ECB (per below):

  1. Their dependence on these sources is still extraordinarily high.
  2. Taken in conjunction with lack of lending to the SMEs, the above suggests that what Ireland needs is not just an EU buyout of banks debts carried by the Exchequer, but also a special funding provision arrangement, which can allow Irish banks to retain high ELA/ECB exposures for at least 5-10 years, to allow economy some breathing room to pay these down. 
  3. While banks deleveraged, households - despite significant savings and higher than Euro area average returns on savings - are nowhere near deleveraging curve, with debt/income ratios falling so far only  to the levels of mid-2009 (we are not even at pre-crisis levels!)



But IMF has more on Irish banks: "Domestic banks have high and rising impaired assets and remain unprofitable, which is eroding their currently strong capital buffers. Gross non-performing loans have risen to 23 percent of PCAR banks gross loans at end September, up from 17 percent a year ago, with 50 percent provisioning coverage." So: to summarize the above:

  • Gross loans declined from  €247.2bn to €229.6bn  Q3 2011-2012
  • Loan loss provisions rose from €19.5bn to €26.5bn (cover rising from 7.89% to 11.54%
  • Gross NPLs (Non-Performing Loans)  meanwhile rose from €42.1bn (17% of Gross Loans) to €53.0bn (23.1% of Gross Loans), so te loans provisions amounted to 46.3% of NPLs in 2011 and now account for 50% of NPLs.
  • However, Net NPLs to net equity ratio has risen dramatically from 68.6% to 109.3%. In other words, equity cushion is being depleted once again, especially as continued accumulation of NPLs coincided with drawdowns of net equity from €32.9bn to €24.2bn.

More form the IMF: "For the first three quarters of 2012, these banks reported a €0.8 billion pre provision loss excluding non-recurrent items (-0.3 percent of average assets) and, under their restructuring plans, they are not expected to break-even until 2014. Although these banks remain well capitalized, with Core Tier 1 ratios of 15.5 percent of risk-weighted assets and 7.5 percent of total assets, these buffers are expected to decline as loans are worked out and will be further eroded if operational losses persist."

What the hell does this mean, you might ask? Oh, why, let IMF speak. Here's the list of core risks faced by Ireland:

"This gradual recovery faces impediments that pose significant risks. Net exports, still the sole engine of growth, are naturally sensitive to any further weakening in trading partner activity. A sustained recovery that generates sufficient job creation also requires a revival of domestic demand, which faces a range of hurdles that create substantial uncertainty around prospects beyond the near-term:

  • Financial reform benefits. In the wake of an exceptionally deep financial crisis, with impacts across the system, financial sector reform challenges remain substantial, and there is uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of the benefits of financial sector reforms for reviving banks‘ profitability and capacity to lend to households and SMEs. 
  • Debt overhangs. Government debt is set to peak at some 122 percent of GDP, household debt is 209 percent of disposable income, and many SMEs are burdened by property-related loans. These debts drag on growth through private deleveraging, reduced access to credit at higher cost, and concerns about future tax burdens.
  • Bank-sovereign loop. These debt stocks are compounded by still large contingent liabilities from the banking system in a scenario where weak growth reduces asset values and heightens loan losses. As a result, the challenges for sovereign and banks in accessing market funding are interlocked, magnifying the growth uncertainties.
  • Fiscal drag. Fiscal consolidation will continue to be significant in coming years, with the growth impact depending on the composition of measures and also on external economic conditions and progress in easing credit constraints."

Do note that the banks play a role in all, I mean all, of the above risks. And the risks are correlated:

"Leaning against such developments with additional fiscal consolidation may help slow down the rise in the debt ratio, but would further reduce growth and raise unemployment and increase risks of hysteresis. Moreover, the resulting higher loan losses would generate new capital needs once banks‘ buffers are exhausted, which could raise debt ratios in the medium term, heightening the challenges to
recovery. Such setbacks in Ireland would exacerbate the broader euro zone crisis..."

And now to 'Boom!' factor: The "risks around medium-term growth prospects are a key source of
fragility in Ireland‘s debt sustainability, in part because prolonged low growth could result in
new capital needs in the financial sector."

In other words, were we to so see fiscally-induced and debt-overhang enabled structurally lower growth (at current rates), the debt crisis can lead to a new capital call from the banks on the Government. In this light, all the Government talk about 'improved' banking operations are, frankly put, tripe.

19/12/2012: IMF gets angry...


So IMF released 8th review of Ireland's programme (link) and just as I speculated here two days ago, the Fund is loading the bases with stronger and stronger language on dithering EU's failure to deal with irish Government debt overhang arising from the banking sector measures.

Quoting from the IMF report, emphasis is mine:

"Ireland’s remaining vulnerabilities imply that prospects for durable market access depend importantly on the delivery of European commitments. Market conditions for Irish sovereign debt are much improved following the  announcements of the ESM direct bank recapitalization instrument and of OMT. But the feasibility of retroactive application of the ESM instrument for Ireland remains unclear as do the conditions for OMT qualification.

Given Ireland‘s high public and private debt levels and uncertain growth prospects, inadequate or delayed delivery on these commitments poses a significant risk that recently started market access could be curtailed, potentially hindering an exit from official financing at end 2013."

The fund, in essence, is now on the record saying that Irish exit from the programme is at risk from only EU failure to act (assuming that irish authorities continue with current path):


"Management of the risks to market access, and hence to meeting the exceptional access criteria, depends on continued strong program performance and also on delivery of euro area commitments."

I agree with the Fund. Ireland has done enough under the programme to move us toward exiting the funding arrangements (whether that is desired or not, is a different question). However, EU institutions (namely ECB and - via absence of support for Ireland - EU Commission) have first forced Ireland into the current insolvency, and then proceeded to stonewall us in the search for workable solutions.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

25/10/2012: Icelandic experience on mortgages writedowns


Very interesting post linking Icelandic experience in mortgages writedowns to Ireland's situation from Sigrún Davíðsdóttir link here.

Needless to say, I agree - we need a sustainable long term solution and this will require dealing systemically with private debt overhang.


Monday, September 10, 2012

10/9/2012: Irish Households Debt Overhang: IMF note


IMF published today three papers relating to Ireland's economy. Each of interest on its own merit and I intend to blog about them.

However, here's a chart that actually summarizes pretty well both the extent of the Irish crisis and the sorry state of affairs expected as we exit it:
Here's IMF's explanation for the household deleveraging process out of what is - by the standards of the chart above - a historically unprecedented debt overhang.


"Under the current forecast, households would reduce debt gradually from about  210 percent of disposable income to 185 percent by 2017. Building on the forecast of the
savings rate, the debt path is calculated based on the IMF desk forecast for a muted recovery
of disposable incomes at below GDP growth. Further, the debt path assumes that households use about half of their savings to retire debt, and new lending growth remains moderate, increasing from 1.6  percent of GDP in 2012 to 5.3 percent by 2017."

Now, give it a thought, folks.

  1. Irish crisis in mortgages is well in excess of anything represented in the above chart;
  2. Irish deleveraging over 9 years (2009-2017) will yield mortgages debt reduction of just 25 percentage points even if we use half of our entire savings to pay down the debts;
  3. This painful deleveraging will still Ireland's mortgages markets in wore shape in 2017 than the second worst peak  of the crisis (the UK) back in 2007.
And here's the chart showing that all the debt paydown to-date has had zero effect on arresting the degree of Irish households leveraging (debt/asset value ratio) as underlying asset values of Irish properties continue to fall:

It is clear from the above that the Irish Government is out to lunch when it comes to dealing with the most pressing crisis we face - the crisis of severe debt overhang on households' balancesheets.